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Abstract: Drivers and risk factors for Influenza A virus transmission across species barriers are poorly
understood, despite the ever present threat to human and animal health potentially on a pandemic scale. Here
we review the published evidence for epidemiological risk factors associated with influenza viruses transmitting
between animal species and from animals to humans. A total of 39 papers were found with evidence of
epidemiological risk factors for influenza virus transmission from animals to humans; 18 of which had some
statistical measure associated with the transmission of a virus. Circumstantial or observational evidence of risk
factors for transmission between animal species was found in 21 papers, including proximity to infected
animals, ingestion of infected material and potential association with a species known to carry influenza virus.
Only three publications were found which presented a statistical measure of an epidemiological risk factor for
the transmission of influenza between animal species. This review has identified a significant gap in knowledge
regarding epidemiological risk factors for the transmission of influenza viruses between animal species.
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INTRODUCTION
Wild birds of the Orders Anseriformes and Charadri-
iformes are the natural reservoir for most Influenza A
viruses (IAVs) (family Orthomyxoviridae), and subtypes
H1–H16 have been isolated from wild birds (Alexander and
Brown 2000; Suarez 2000, 2010). Bats have recently been
identified as hosts for subtypes H17 and H18 (Tong et al.
2012; Tong et al. 2013). Influenza A viruses can infect
mammalian species either endemically or cause sporadic
outbreaks (and occasional spillover from host species)
(Ducatez et al. 2008) in, for example, pigs (H1, H2, H3),
horses (H3 and H7), dogs (H3), marine mammals (in-
cluding pinnipeds and cetaceans) (H3, H7, H10 and H13)
and humans (H1, H2, H3) (Alexander and Brown 2000;
Daly et al. 2008; Reperant et al. 2009; Crispe et al. 2011;
Freidl et al. 2014). Occasional spillover infections of various
subtypes in a range of mammalian species have been
identified including H5 in domestic cats and less com-
monly, zoo felids (Keawcharoen et al. 2004; Kuiken et al.
2004; Thanawongnuwech et al. 2005; Songserm et al. 2006;
Yingst et al. 2006; Klopfleisch et al. 2007b). Transmission of
IAVs between humans and other mammals has also been
demonstrated in both directions (Alexander and Brown
2000; Van Reeth et al. 2007). Transmission generally occurs
through direct contact or indirect contact via environ-
mental contamination or ingestion of infected material
(Keawcharoen et al. 2004; Thanawongnuwech et al. 2005;
Songserm et al. 2006; Daly et al. 2008; Crispe et al. 2011).
Various studies have been conducted to identify risk
factors for transmission of IAVs between species, including
from animals to humans and between animal species. Much
of this work has focused on intrinsic or virological risk factors
(Munoz et al. 2015) while epidemiological (environmental
or host) risk factors have been less studied. These include
direct/indirect exposure through, for example, backyard
farming, keeping poultry in the home, preparation of food
for consumption and live poultry markets, occupational
exposure and environmental exposures such as through
swimming and bathing (Mounts et al. 1999; Dudley 2008;
Gray et al. 2008; Vong et al. 2009; Zhou et al. 2009; Gerloff
et al. 2011; Khan et al. 2012; Krueger et al. 2013).
The primary aim of this literature review was to
identify epidemiological risk factors associated with trans-
mission of IAVs between species, including from animals to
humans. A further objective of this review was to identify
knowledge gaps of influenza epidemiology to which future
research could be directed.
METHODS
Literature searches were performed between February 2012
and September 2015 to identify relevant papers describing
epidemiological risk factors associated with an IAV being
transmitted between species. The primary method of reference
identification was electronic searches carried out in Web of
Knowledge (which simultaneously searches Web of Science
1995, Current contents 1998, CAB abstracts 1910, Medline
1950) to search all available published literature on epidemi-
ological risk factors associated with jump of IAVs between
species (Table 1). Search terms also used to identify papers
with epidemiological risk factors associated with the trans-
mission of IAVs from animals to humans included: ‘‘influen-
za’’, ‘‘influenza virus’’, ‘‘animals’’, ‘‘swine’’, ‘‘birds’’, ‘‘poultry’’,
‘‘wildbird’’, ‘‘waterbird’’, ‘‘waterfowl’’, ‘‘goose’’, ‘‘duck’’,
‘‘chicken’’, ‘‘turkey’’, ‘‘environment’’, ‘‘animal-to-human’’,
‘‘transmission-to-humans’’, ‘‘interspecies transmission’’,
‘‘human’’, ‘‘case’’, ‘‘seroprevalence’’, ‘‘serosurveillance’’,
‘‘prevalence’’, ‘‘incidence’’, ‘‘risk factor’’ and ‘‘exposure’’.
The first literature searches were carried out for all
papers published between 1910 and the dates of searching.
Language restrictions were not placed on the searches if the
abstract was available in English; however, articles were not
translated. Review articles were generally not included be-
cause the aim of this study was to identify primary studies
that identified and measured risk factors; however, one
review was screened to identify additional references. If
screening of the title and/or abstract met the inclusion
criteria, full text was assessed for eligibility.
The following inclusion criteria were applied for the
review: no timeframe, global geographic scope, avian and
mammalian species (including risk factors for the virus to
spread from animals to humans), all subtypes, exposures
(environmental, husbandry, biosecurity, marketing/trade,
disease management related), study design (observational)
and types of literature (published, grey). Articles related to
Influenza B and C and experimental studies were excluded.
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The first searches were not successful in locating rele-
vant epidemiological risk factor information (only one
anecdotal report found). Further approaches in finding
relevant publications included reviewing (1) Reference lists
of publications retrieved through the original literature
search; (2) References known to co-authors of this study;
(3) Databases held by laboratories, research institutions or
international organisations, e.g. EMPRES-i1 (FAO 2012),
and (4) Proceedings from conferences on influenza from
2012.
In the original literature searches carried out in 2012, a
total of 731 references from online searches were screened
for eligibility; of these, 444 abstracts were reviewed and 85
papers read in full. In addition, 58 papers were reviewed in
their entirety after screening a review article (Reperant et al.
2009) and other references recommended by co-authors.
More than half of the publications reviewed related to
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1. In
searches carried out to include papers published between
2012 and 2015, additional 222 abstracts were reviewed and
110 papers read in full.
Eligible papers were grouped into two broad categories
(some papers were relevant to more than one category and
so may be counted more than once): (1) cross-species
transmission among animals (not necessarily referring to
sustained transmission and could relate to a single event)
(n = 21) and (2) cross-species transmission of animal in-
fluenza viruses to humans (n = 39).
RESULTS
Risk Factors for the Transmission of Influenza A
Viruses Between Animal Species
A total of 21 papers described epidemiological risk factors
that could be associated with IAVs transmitting between
animals (Table 2). Most papers described observational or
circumstantial evidence and three reported a statistical
measure of risk factors identified (Biswas et al. 2011;
Aguirre-Ezkauriatza et al. 2012; Zhou et al. 2015). Eleven
papers presented circumstantial evidence, speculating on
factors influencing the transmission of IAVs between spe-
cies, but with no direct evidence. Ten publications pre-
sented observational reports of the epidemiological risk
factors in a particular incident. Generally, publications re-
ferred to one incident (some a single case, others with large
mortalities) and due to the genetic characteristics of the
virus (e.g. relatedness to another strain), led to possible
hypotheses of transmission routes from one species to
another.
Twenty papers described incidents involving proximity
to infected animals, and seven described the feeding or
ingestion of infected animal organs. Three papers referred
to the transmission of IAV (of swine or turkey origin, in
both directions) potentially from close proximity of farms
or to external water sources (Karasin et al. 2000; Suarez
et al. 2002; Yassine et al. 2011). As pigs have receptors for
both avian and human influenza viruses, they could play an
important role in transmission of IAV between birds and
mammals (Myers et al. 2007; Van Reeth 2007).
Four papers described transmission between marine
mammals (Geraci et al. 1982; Hinshaw et al. 1986; Callan
et al. 1995); three involved harbour seals (Phoca vitulina)
and one, pilot whales (Globicaphala melaena). All four
papers suggested close contact (direct or indirect) with
coastal birds or bird faeces at feeding or haul-out sites as
the source of infection. Geraci et al. (1982) referred to
H7N7 infection in harbour seals potentially being infected
from water- and shore birds. More recently, avian H3N8
virus has emerged in harbour seal populations in the USA
causing high mortality. Although no epidemiological risk
factors were stated, recovered isolates were similar to a
virus that has been circulating in North American water-
fowl since at least 2002 but showed mutations thought to
be associated with its adaptation to the mammalian host
(Anthony et al. 2012). In 2014, Zohari et al. (2014) first
reported IAV isolation of H10N7 in harbour seals (Phoca
vitulina) from a mass mortality event in Sweden, the first
reported in Europe and the first known isolation of the H10
subtype virus in seals. Genetically, this virus is closely re-
lated to Eurasian IAVs from wild and domestic birds,
supporting the theory that the subtype has been transmit-
ted from birds to seals by direct or indirect contact.
Close contact to coastal birds and crows (Corvus cor-
vus) was thought to be a potential route of transmission in
farmed mink (Mustela lutreola) in Sweden (Klingeborn
et al. 1985). Yoon et al. (2012) speculated that a source for
H1N2 infection in mink in the USA was uncooked turkey
meat. Although the virus was considered to be of swine
origin as the strain was closely related to the US endemic
swine influenza virus (SIV), there was no obvious source to
1FAO EMPRES-i compiles and displays information from numerous sources (FAO
representatives or country missions, FAO reports, OIE, official government sources,
European Commission, FAO reference centres, laboratories and FAO collaborators)
to provide full and accurate information on the animal disease situation worldwide.
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the mink (no pork by-products fed, or swine herds nearby).
Authors speculated the source of infection was uncooked
turkey meat since cross-species transmission of SIV par-
ticularly of this subtype is known to occur in US swine
herds.
Feeding on infectious tissues from birds or horses
(Equus ferus) has been linked to cross-species transmission
of HPAI H5N1 virus in leopards (Panthera pardus), tigers
(Panthera tigris), stone martens (Martes foina), cats (Felis
catus) and H3N8 virus in dogs (Canis lupus) (Keawcharoen
et al. 2004; Songserm et al. 2006; Yingst et al. 2006; Klop-
fleisch et al. 2007a; Daly et al. 2008). Proximity to horses
has also been described as a possible cause of transmission
of H3N8 virus to dogs (Kirkland et al. 2010; Crispe et al.
2011). Although the role of dogs was not clearly demon-
strated in the epidemiology of the disease, the permanent
Table 1. Summary of Search Strings Used
Date of search and search number Search string
24/02/2012
1 Topic = ((influenza* OR flu* OR orthomyxovir*)) AND Topic =
(((jump* NEAR species) OR cross?species OR inter?species))
2 Topic = (influenza* OR flu* OR orthomyxovir*) AND Topic =
(jump* NEAR species OR cross?species OR inter?species) NOT
Topic = (human) AND Topic = (pandemic)
3 Topic = (influenza* OR flu* OR orthomyxovir*) AND Topic =
(jump* NEAR species) OR Topic = (cross?species
OR inter?species) NOT Topic = (human)
4 Topic = (influenza* OR flu* OR orthomyxovir*) AND Topic =
(‘‘risk factors’’ or ‘‘risk’’ or ‘‘factors’’) AND
Topic = (pandemic) AND Topic = (spread) AND Topic = (zoonotic)
15/03/2012
5 Topic = (influenza* or orthomyxovir*) AND Topic = (bird or avian)
AND Topic = (equine or horse)
AND Topic = (canine or dog) AND Topic = (felid or cat)
20/03/2012
6 Topic = (transmission of influenza from birds to cats)
7 Topic = (transmission of influenza from horses to dogs)
8 Topic = (transmission of influenza from birds to swine)
9 Topic = (transmission of influenza from birds to seals)
16/05/2014 Search strings related to searches 1–9 repeated
10
29/04/2015 Search strings related to searches 1–9 repeated
11
11/09/2015
12 TS = ‘‘influenza A’’ AND TS = (‘‘risk factor*’’ OR determinant*)
AND TS = (transmission OR spread) AND
TS = (zoono* OR ‘‘animal to human’’ OR ‘‘animal-to-human’’)
NOT TS = (anthropono* OR ‘‘reverse zoono*’’
OR ‘‘human to animal’’ OR ‘‘human-to-animal’’)
and
TS = (H7N9 NOT H5N1) AND TS = (‘‘risk factor*’’ OR determinant*)
AND TS = (transmission OR spread) AND
TS = (zoono* OR ‘‘animal to human’’ OR ‘‘animal-to-human’’)
NOT TS = (anthropono* OR ‘‘reverse zoono*’’
OR ‘‘human to animal’’ OR ‘‘human-to-animal’’)
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presence of dogs in stables (in the US–Mexico Border) was
found to be significantly associated with an increase in
H3N8 seroprevalence in horses (MH-OR 1.327; (Aguirre-
Ezkauriatza et al. 2012)). Proximity to wild birds (and the
potential for scavenging) was also a potential risk for cats to
be infected with influenza virus HPAI H5N1 virus (Klop-
fleisch et al. 2007b). A sero-epidemiological study carried
out in Southern China (Sun et al. 2014) found little or no
evidence of transmission of H5N1 virus to cats. Only one of
1680 blood samples from cats tested positive by haemag-
glutination inhibition (HI) test, and none could be con-
firmed by neutralisation test/assay (NT). In China, Zhou
et al. (2015) studied H9N2, H3N2 and H5N1 viruses and
identified that cats found in live poultry markets were more
likely to have evidence of previous H5N1 virus infection
than those sampled from poultry farms in rural areas (OR
2.9, P < 0.05).
IAV of subtype H10N5 was isolated from pigs and is a
virus rarely isolated from mammals, and thus provides an
example of likely interspecies transmission to pigs (Amir-
salehy et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2013);
Feng et al. (2014); Panahi et al. (2014)).
A study by Biswas et al. (2011) in Bangladesh
hypothesised that crows (Corvus splendens) played a role in
the epidemiology of HPAI H5N1. In 2008, mass mortality
events in crows were reported in eight districts where H5N1
HPAI virus was also detected. Indeed, the presence of dead
crows at or near a farm was associated with increased odds
of HPAI H5N1 virus occurrence in commercial chickens
(OR 47.4).
Risk Factors for the Transmission of Influenza A
Viruses from Animals to Humans
A total of 39 papers were identified that considered epi-
demiological risk factors for cross-species transmission
from animals to humans. Eighteen reported a statistical
measure of the risk factors described (Table 3), 16 of which
referred to avian to human transmission and around half
referred to HPAI H5N1 virus in Asia, which is unsurprising
given the widespread distribution and impact of this virus
in the region.
Direct or Indirect Exposure to Poultry (or Other Species)
Sixteen papers referred to exposure to poultry as a risk for
human infection and the odds (OR) for associated risk
ranged from 1.1 to 506.
Most publications investigating transmission of HPAI
H5N1 virus from animals to humans focused on direct or
indirect exposure to poultry as a significant risk factor for
infection, including housing poultry in the family home or
in the neighbourhood, preparation of poultry for con-
sumption, contact with sick or dead birds and live bird
markets (Dudley 2008; Khan et al. 2012).
A large number of surveys and studies describing the
risk of HPAI H5N1 virus transmitting from poultry to
humans have been documented in the literature. Khan et al.
(2012) described aspects of family (backyard) poultry
management that are known through other studies to be
associated with transmission of infection; close proximity
of poultry housing to owners living quarters, providing
feed to healthy and sick birds and slaughtering birds inside
the home.
Study results from Krueger et al. (2013) found that an
increase in H9N2 virus antibodies in Thai villagers was
associated with exposure to 7–20 birds/day (OR 2.3)
compared to 1–6 birds/day (OR 0.9) or 21–12,000 birds/-
day (OR 1.1), suggesting backyard type flocks pose a higher
risk of infecting humans, possibly due to closer physical
contact with the birds as well as contact during the
slaughtering process.
In China, direct or indirect exposure (within 1 m) to
sick and dead poultry was a significant risk factor for HPAI
H5N1 virus infection among all participants, both urban
and rural (Zhou et al. 2009). In Egypt, Tseng et al. (2010)
found that in 84.6% of confirmed cases of HPAI H5N1
virus infection in humans between 2006 and 2009, there
had been contact with sick or dead poultry or birds.
Backyard and rooftop-owned birds were suggested as a
more significant risk factor for human infection of HPAI
H5N1 virus rather than those from poultry farms. Minh
et al. (2009) found that the presence of outbreaks in poultry
in the same or neighbouring district in Vietnam was
associated with increased likelihood of human infection.
Exposure to poultry through visits to wet poultry
markets was also found to be significantly associated with
the transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus and other IAV
subtypes to humans (FAO 2006; Zhou et al. 2009). Mounts
et al. (1999) found that exposure to live poultry in Hong
Kong (by visiting either a retail poultry stall or a market
selling live poultry) in the week before illness was signifi-
cantly associated with HPAI H5N1 virus infection (OR
4.5). The handling of poultry (placing in cages and/or
poultry areas) (OR 5.8, P = .05) and the cleaning of cages
and poultry areas (OR 5, P = 0.09) has also been associated
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with increased odds of HPAI H5N1 virus infection in hu-
mans, in Cambodia (Vong et al. 2009). With the emergence
of H7N9 in 2013 in China, studies describing cases of
human infection often report recent exposure to poultry
through visiting live poultry markets as a key epidemio-
logical characteristic (Guan et al. 2013; Li et al. 2014;
Zhuang et al. 2013; Gong et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2015). The
odds of exposure and thus infection were found to be
higher in people that had visited live poultry markets (OR
ranging from 3.4 to 9). Ai et al. (2013) carried out a case–
control study to identify risk factors for human infection
with H7N9 virus. In their multivariate analyses, the odds of
H7N9 virus infection were nine times higher where direct
contact with poultry occurred in live poultry markets (OR
9.1). Liu et al.’s (2014) case–control study in 2013 found
that the odds of H7N9 virus infection were 3.4 times higher
(OR 3.4) where visits to live poultry markets had occurred,
even after adjusting for poultry contact and other con-
founding factors.
Occupational Exposure
Occupational exposure to infected birds or pigs has been
implicated as increasing the risk for human infection.
Buxton Bridges et al. (2002) found that most occupational
duties involving poultry exposure in Hong Kong were
associated with increased odds of being seropositive for
HPAI H5N1 virus. In a stratified analysis, risk factors most
highly associated with H5 seropositivity were butchering
poultry and exposure to diseased poultry with greater than
10% mortality. Some potential evidence of protective risk
factors was found; not living on a poultry farm (OR 0.4, CI
0.1–2.1) and no febrile respiratory illness (fever/chest
infections) since November 1997 (OR 0.8, CI 0.5–1.3), al-
though the 95% confidence intervals for the factors in-
cluded 1, so further study or analysis would be required to
clarify these associations. Mounts et al.’s (1999) study in
Hong Kong found that activities relating to poultry
preparation or eating, travel with and contact with wild
birds, for example, through hunting, were not significantly
different between cases and controls.
Occupational exposure at live bird markets has been
associated with increased risk of IAV transmission to hu-
mans. In 2013, human infections of H7N9 virus were re-
ported in Eastern China, which led to live bird market
closures in heavily affected areas (Chowell et al. 2013).
Evidence points to an avian reservoir with the virus found
in chickens at some live bird markets thought to be the
main source of human infections (Lam et al. 2013). Fuller
et al. (2014) identified that the risk of H7N9 virus infection
in humans increased by 8% for each additional live bird
market per km2 (OR 1.08).
In a study on H6N2 virus in China (Xin et al. 2015),
the authors found that seropositivity was highest in
workers in live poultry markets, backyard poultry farmers
and workers in wild bird habitats, with an increased risk for
human infection (OR 2.1, 1.1 and 1.3, respectively), com-
pared to exposure through occupations such as poultry
farming (OR 0.4), poultry slaughter factory (OR 0.4) and
others (OR 0.9).
Elevated antibody titres to H6 and H7 viruses have
been associated with the following factors in a study con-
ducted in rural United States (USA): working with poultry,
chronic medical conditions, and hunting of wild birds
(Gray et al. 2008). A further study in the USA found that
turkey workers involved in small-scale production of
backyard or free range flocks (flocks of <1000) were
considered to have an increased risk of IAV infections,
from increased antibody titres against H4, H5, H6, H9 and
H10 IAV subtypes. Adjusted odds ratios (after adjusting for
antibody titres against human influenza H1N1 virus and/or
exposure to chickens and swine) varied between 3.9 and
15.3 for the IAV strains when compared to non-exposed
controls (Kayali et al. 2010). Involvement in depopulation
following an outbreak is also a potentially high-risk activity,
and Bos et al. (2010) found a higher probability of infection
was associated with clinical inspection (7.6%) and active
culling of poultry (6.2%) during the HPAI H7N7 virus
Netherlands epizootic in 2003. The probability of infection
through depopulation was negligible where biosecurity was
described as ‘‘managed’’ (0.0%), and where there was
cleaning assistance during depopulation (0.0%).
One study conducted in Luxembourg identified a
statistical measure for infection from pigs to humans where
the odds of having antibodies to pandemic (p)H1N1 virus
were 2.4–3.9 times greater in swine workers than controls,
and to swine influenza virus (SIV) were 1.3–9.9 times
greater (Gerloff et al. 2011). When comparing occupations
among cases (swine workers), farm workers were more
likely to be SIV (OR 2.3) or pH1N1 virus (OR 1.2)
seropositive than slaughterhouse workers. Male slaughter-
house workers were more likely to be SIV (OR 1.7) and/or
pH1N1 seropositive (OR 1.1) than controls (Gerloff et al.
2011).
In Olsen et al.’s (2002) study on pig farm owners in the
USA, the number of seropositive samples (to swine and
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human H1 influenza viruses) in farm participants (cases)
was significantly higher than in urban control cohorts.
Kumar et al. (2013) investigated awareness of IAVs in
South India using multivariate analyses. There was a greater
awareness in people with increased education (11 + years
(y) vs. 0–3 years, OR 43.66), time spent working with
poultry (5–10 years (OR 3.03) and >10 years (OR 4.22),
non-labourers (OR 7.75) compared to labourers and urban
location (OR 11.9) compared to rural. This may indicate
risks to rural farmers who may not have a great awareness
of risks associated, or ways to reduce the risk of trans-
mission in their flock or to themselves.
Exposure to Non-Poultry Species
Ramirez-Martinez et al. (2013) investigated seropositivity
of dog owners for pH1N1, H1N1 and H3N2 viruses and
found no evidence associating seropositivity with factors
such as age, sex and whether dogs leave the home in a 24-h
period. The only statistically significant factor was vacci-
nation of the dog owners in the last 6 months against
subtype pH1N1 virus.
Burnell et al. (2014) found that despite prolonged
exposure to horses known to have acute EIV infections,
human subjects did not show evidence (serologic response)
of recent infection.
Exposure of swine influenza H3N2 virus at swine
agricultural fairs (both to humans and from humans to
swine) has been implicated as a risk factor in the USA
where a particular virus strain was circulating among
exhibition swine in 2012 (Ohio, USA). The virus was iso-
lated from swine at ten fairs, and seven of the ten fairs were
epidemiologically linked to human infections (Bowman
et al. 2014a). Most human cases were directly or indirectly
exposed to swine. In a second study by Bowman et al.
(2014b), multivariate analysis identified that for every in-
crease of 20 pigs at a fair, the odds of infection in pigs
increased by 1.01 times.
Water Sources
Environmental exposure such as swimming and bathing in
contaminated water (Dudley 2008) has also been impli-
cated as an epidemiological risk factor for human infection
with HPAI H5N1 virus. Vong et al. (2009) indicated that
HPAI H5N1 virus seropositive persons (cases) were more
likely to report swimming or bathing in ponds (OR 11.3)
than control subjects. Using ponds as a water source had
increased odds but was not statistically significant (OR 6.8,
P = 0.08). Khan et al. (2012) describe survey results where
sharing the same water as poultry for bathing, washing
clothes and fishing posed a risk for transmission for HPAI
H5N1 from poultry to humans. In a study by Zhou et al.
(2014), H9N2 virus seropositive participants indicated that
they sometimes bathed or swam in swine farm ponds, and
sometimes had close poultry contact. Other factors such as
age, gender and history of pig or bird contact were not
significantly associated with IAV infection among swine
farm residents tested. Lack of an indoor water source has
also been identified as a risk factor for infection, linked to
poor hand washing practices (Mounts et al. 1999; Buxton
Bridges et al. 2002; Dinh et al. 2006).
Human Demographics
Human demographic factors such as age and gender are
also described in papers as potentially associated with
transmission of IAVs. Smallman-Raynor and Cliff (2007)
reported on the skewed age distribution of confirmed HPAI
H5N1 virus infection cases towards children and young
adults from 229 cases from ten countries across Africa, Asia
and Europe. Lohiniva et al. (2013) reported 54% of cases of
HPAI H5N1 were in children <15 years. Chen et al.
(2007) also found that children and young adults had a
higher probability of infection when investigating 224 cases
across Vietnam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia and Thailand
between 2004 and 2006.
In comparison with HPAI H5N1 virus where younger
adults and children have increased likelihood of infection,
studies on cases of H7N9 virus infection have found that
the risk of transmission was higher in people aged over 60
(Cowling et al. 2013; Li et al. 2014; Zhuang et al. 2013;
Gong et al. 2014). A study of cases of H9N2 virus exposure
in Cambodia by Blair et al. (2013) also found that people
over the age of 60 had increased serological evidence of
previous infection (OR 6.9).
In a cross-sectional survey of 3600 backyard poultry
owners in Cambodia, males had a higher exposure risk
potential to HPAI H5N1 virus than females across all age
groups (P < 0.001) (Van Kerkhove et al. 2008). Also,
males between the ages of 26–40 reported practices of
contact with poultry which were associated with increased
risk potential of H5N1 transmission. A higher proportion
of H7N9 virus infection cases have been identified in males
(Li et al. 2014; Zhuang et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2015).
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Location of residents (urban vs. rural) has been iden-
tified as a potential risk factor for transmission of H7N9 to
humans, likely linked to increased exposure to live poultry
markets. The proportion of cases that are from urban
residents has varied from 65% (30/46) (Gong et al. 2014) to
84% (69/82) (Li et al. 2014).
DISCUSSION
While the emergence of new or zoonotic influenza viruses
has been an undeniable threat to human health and pros-
perity for many years, progress in understanding how,
where and why new viruses emerge has been limited. Part
of the reason for this is that disease emergence is a complex
process and IAVs have a complex ecology, but also this
review has highlighted the lack of epidemiological studies
for interspecies transmission of IAVs.
We have reviewed the available literature on studies
relating to the epidemiological risk factors associated with
IAVs being transmitted from one species to another (ani-
mal-to-animal and animal-to-human). There was a distinct
lack of relevant publications relating to epidemiological risk
factors found through initial searches conducted, particu-
larly where cross-species transmission between animals was
concerned, and hence, there is potential for bias in the
selection of publications obtained. Many publications
identified by the initial searches that contained data or
information on transmission of IAV between species were
focussed on virological rather than epidemiological risk
factors, and hence not within the scope of this review (see
Munoz et al. (2015) for a review of virological risk factors).
While different IAVs can vary in their phenotypic proper-
ties affecting risk of interspecies transmission, common
patterns and trends among IAVs are likely to occur, par-
ticularly for closely related viruses and those within similar
host populations.
There were several epidemiological risk factors identi-
fied repeatedly across two or more studies, highlighting
increased risk of transmission of IAVs between animal
species and from animals to humans: (1) transmission of
IAVs between animal species was associated with contact
between species including ingestion of infectious tissues
(Table 2); (2) close contact with coastal birds or bird faeces
at feeding or haul-out sites was identified as a source of
transmission from birds to marine mammals; (3) close
proximity of farms (or to outdoor water sources) was
associated with possible transmission between pigs and
turkeys. Exposure to infected species through direct and
indirect contact is intuitively a key risk factor for cross-
species transmission of IAVs, supported by observational
evidence of H3N8 virus infection in dogs with indirect
contact with infected horses, and H5N1 virus infection in
cats fed on infected poultry meat.
Transmission of IAVs from animal species to humans
has been associated with contact and exposure to animals,
particularly direct or indirect contact with sick or dead
poultry. Most studies were related to HPAI H5N1 virus in
poultry in Asia, which is unsurprising given the massive
impact of this virus in the region. This geographical bias in
study location is an important consideration in achieving a
representative perspective in future. An increasing number
of studies have been conducted identifying risk factors
relating to human behaviours, for example, through visit-
ing live poultry markets (HPAI H7N9), food preparation
and sharing water sources (including swimming and
bathing in water used by poultry and/or other bird species
(HPAI H5N1), occupational risk in swine workers
(pH1N1), and exposure at swine agricultural fairs (H3N2).
Age of humans also appears to affect the likelihood of
infection of IAVs; with HPAI H5N1, a number of studies
described children and young adults as having increased
association with infection, compared to HPAI H7N9 and
also H9N2 where risk of transmission was higher in people
over the age of 60. The older average age of humans in-
fected with H7N9 virus may be linked to a preference by
older generations to attend traditional wet markets,
whereas younger people may have greater awareness of the
risks of IAV transmission.
The lack of published studies with a statistical measure of
epidemiological risk factors for transmission of IAVs be-
tween animal species was a key finding of this study. There
appears to be a significant gap in knowledge on which epi-
demiological factors are most associated with cross-species
transmission, particularly for subtypes other than HPAI
H5N1 virus. Among avian influenza viruses, almost all
studies involve H5 and H7 subtypes due to their impact on
poultry health. The bias studies towards these viruses over-
look the potential role of other avian influenza viruses in
cross-species transmission. Van Reeth (2013) commented
that although interspecies transmission of IAVs occurs reg-
ularly, this is with limited spread and often transient infec-
tion; only occasionally establishing a stable virus lineage in a
new host species. Nonetheless, these ‘‘species jumps’’ can
potentially have very severe consequences and are a key step
in the disease emergence process.
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A number of studies investigating the spatial distri-
bution and co-occurrence of relevant host species (e.g.
poultry, pigs and humans) have been conducted to identify
geographical ‘‘hot spots’’, but the myriad of other poten-
tially relevant and confounding factors that show spatial
variation leaves plenty of progress to be made for this ap-
proach (Hill et al. 2015).
It is difficult to extrapolate and weigh the relative
importance of risk factors across publications, particularly
when looking at subtypes other than HPAI H5N1, due to
different study designs, settings, study size and statistical
measures used. More studies that statistically measure
potential risk factors for cross-species transmission are
needed to improve both the breadth and depth of knowl-
edge of epidemiological risk factors in this field. Carefully
designed prospective studies and standardised or even
harmonised approaches to risk factor description and
measurement, along with detailed analyses of available data
from influenza outbreaks, could greatly improve our
knowledge in this area and support our ability to manage
risk and conduct successful control programmes in the
future. Such studies, particularly for viruses other than
HPAI H5N1 (particularly H7N9 and H5N8), would help to
identify epidemiological risks, both in transmitting between
and within species. Results of these studies will help guide
policies and control measures to allow more effective dis-
ease control and mitigate the risk of emergence.
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